There is an argument to the effect that one is not free (at least for the most part) to form beliefs at will. This is the problem to which Alston called attention. Instead, it is meant to draw attention to a problem for the very concept of epistemic obligation. The reason Feldman separates the two is that "the moral consequences of an epistemically obligatory belief might be very bad." He does not further explain here what he means.īut this is not the thrust of the discussion.
If he means that such belief is morally wrong, then he disagrees with Feldman's point that sometimes it is morally permissible to believe what is not epistemically permissible to believe. Clifford, as we saw in the lecture on James's "The Will to Believe," had proposed that it is always wrong to believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Such obligations could conflict with epistemic obligations, as in the case of a family-member who has always behaved in an untrustworthy manner. that one's family-members are trustworthy. So suppose that there are moral obligations to have certain beliefs, e.g. (The moral philosophy of Kant, for example, is of this sort.) Whether one is morally obligated to do or refrain from doing something is not based on whether the action serves a person's own interests. There is no outcome-based excuse, so to speak, in his defiance of the evidence.Ī necessary condition for epistemic obligations, then is that they "arise from a purely disinterested and impartial perspective." This is not a sufficient condition, though, at least from the standpoint of some standard moral theories. But with respect merely to the truth of his belief, he is disinterested. He has an interest in passing, which is why we are inclined to say that he is practically blameless. The contrast between the two can be understood in terms of his personal stake in the outcome of the belief. Jones would be epistemically blameworthy but practically blameless for passing. The two points of view here are, respectively, the epistemic and the practical. But from another point of view, the answer is that he cannot be blamed for doing something that would appear to double his chances of success. From one point of view, the answer would be that he is, since the preponderance of evidence points to his failing, whether or not he believes that he will pass. Jones is is a normal student and is aware of the passing rates, though not of any reason why he would be different from anyone else in his performance.įeldman asks whether Jones would be blameworthy if he were to believe that he would pass the examination. The distinction between practical and epistemic obligations is motivated by a scenario, in which a student, Jones, faces an oral examination from a teacher who passes 10% of students overall, but 20% of those who believe they will pass. In Section I, he discusses the relations between the three, coming to the conclusion that they are distinct from one another. He wants to uphold a notion of epistemic obligation (which might also be called duty) while holding that in many cases we are not capable to carrying our obligation out.įeldman distinguishes between three types of obligations: practical, epistemic, and moral. Another approach, that of Alston, is to claim that matters of "duty" are peripheral to the central concern of theory of knowledge, which is understanding epistemic justification. One way of dealing with this situation is simply to declare that our duty is confined to the formation of opinion in those cases where we are free to decide what to opine. If we try to extend this duty to belief in general, we run up against the problem noted by Alston, that belief often is involuntary. Opinion seems to be the kind of thing we have voluntary control over and hence suitable as the subject of duty. This implies that the formation of opinion is voluntary.
James described "two ways of looking at our duty in matters of opinion." One duty is to know the truth the other is to avoid error. Text: Richard Feldman, "Epistemic Obligations" (1988) Lecture Notes, UC Davis Philosophy 102, Theory of
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